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Despite an increasing focus on the neural basis of hu-
man decision making in neuroscience, relatively little
attention has been paid to decision making in social
settings. Moreover, although human social decision
making has been explored in a social psychology
context, few neural explanations for the observed
findings have been considered. To bridge this gap
and improve models of human social decision mak-
ing, we investigated whether acquiring a good repu-
tation, which is an important incentive in human so-
cial behaviors, activates the same reward circuitry
as monetary rewards. In total, 19 subjects partici-
pated in functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) experiments involving monetary and social re-
wards. The acquisition of one’s good reputation ro-
bustly activated reward-related brain areas, notably
the striatum, and these overlapped with the areas ac-
tivated by monetary rewards. Our findings support
the idea of a ‘‘common neural currency’’ for rewards
and represent an important first step toward a neural
explanation for complex human social behaviors.
INTRODUCTION
The decision-making process has recently attracted the atten-
tion of researchers from various disciplines, and considerable
progress has been made in understanding its neural basis
(Daw and Doya, 2006; Montague et al., 2006; Sanfey et al.,
2006). However, the neural basis of human decision making in
social situations is relatively less well understood because of
its complexity. During the mid-twentieth century, in an effort to
explain human social decision-making behaviors, psychologists
incorporated the ‘‘rational agent’’ model, which is a basic eco-
nomic theory, into the model of human social decision making.
The social exchange theory (Homans, 1958; Lawler and Thye,
1999; Thibaut and Kelley, 1959) argues that social behaviors
largely stem from the desire to maximize the ratio of social re-
wards to social costs, as is the case for monetary rewards and
costs in economic settings. According to this theory, an individ-
ual engages in a certain social behavior (e.g., helping others) only284 Neuron 58, 284–294, April 24, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc.when the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. Importantly,
the benefits in such a case take the form not only of material re-
wards, such as food and money, but also of more abstract re-
wards, such as social approval from others. This theory provides
a base from which to explore complex human social decision
making and behaviors in the simple terms of ‘‘reward.’’
In the present study, from among the many possible rewards
in human social interactions, we focused on an individual’s rep-
utation or the impression of an individual formed by others. The
importance of processing one’s own reputation in human social
decision making has been highlighted by the theoretical
research on the evolution of human cooperation (Fehr and Fisch-
bacher, 2003). It has been shown that cooperation in iterated
games is significantly affected by the concern for reputation
(Kreps and Wilson, 1982), and that an individual’s motivation
to acquire a good reputation or ‘‘image score’’ (Milinski et al.,
2001; Wedekind and Milinski, 2000) might drive cooperation
through indirect reciprocity. Social psychological studies have
also shown that social approval has a profound impact on every-
day decision making (Benabou and Tirole, 2006). The recogni-
tion that one has a good reputation can induce a feeling of hap-
piness (i.e., a hedonic component of reward or ‘‘liking’’), and
individuals are often motivated to seek such social approval
(i.e., a motivational component of reward or ‘‘wanting’’) accord-
ing to behavioral evidence. For example, human subjects were
motivated to present themselves in a positive manner or to en-
gage in prosocial behaviors when their perception of being
watched by others was enhanced (Bateson et al., 2006; Haley
and Fessler, 2005; Kurzban et al., 2007; Paulhus, 1984). Thus, al-
though social exchange theory assumes that gaining a good
reputation is a reward and ample behavioral evidence supports
its significant role in human decision making in a social context,
the way in which its reward value is represented in the human
brain remains unclear. Furthermore, while previous neuroimag-
ing studies have shown that activities in the reward-related
area, the striatum, are modulated by the perception of the moral
character (or reputation) of others (Delgado et al., 2005; Singer
et al., 2004) and that the striatum is involved in developing the
reputation of other players during an economic game (King-
Casas et al., 2005), to our knowledge, there has been no study
investigating how the brain processes one’s own positive repu-
tation. Understanding this process is an essential step in con-
structing a neural model of human social decision making based
on social reward.
Neuron
Social Reward Processing in the StriatumThe goals of the present study were to investigate whether
the acquisition of a good reputation activated reward-related
brain areas, specifically the striatum, and, if so, whether this so-
cial reward activated the same reward circuitry as monetary re-
wards, as predicted by social exchange theory. The striatum is
known to be involved in reward processing. Striatal neurons
were reported to show activity in response to liquid and food
rewards in nonhuman primates and were activated by both
the anticipation and delivery of the reward (Schultz, 2000;
Schultz et al., 2000). Using functional magnetic resonance im-
aging (fMRI) and positron emission tomography (PET), similar
findings have been reported in humans: the striatum showed
increased activation in response not only to primary rewards
such as liquid or food (Berns et al., 2001; McClure et al.,
2003; Pagnoni et al., 2002) and sexual stimuli (Arnow et al.,
2002; Redoute et al., 2000) but also to money, which is a sec-
ondary reward (Breiter et al., 2001; Delgado et al., 2000, 2004;
Elliott et al., 2000; Knutson et al., 2000, 2001; Nieuwenhuis
et al., 2005; Thut et al., 1997). We therefore predicted that
when individuals perceived themselves to have a good reputa-
tion among others, the striatum would be activated, and the ac-
tivated areas would overlap with those activated by monetary
rewards.
Nineteen subjects participated in two fMRI experiments (i.e.,
monetary and social reward experiments) on two separate
days. In the monetary reward experiment, the subjects per-
formed a simple gambling task (Figure 1A). In each trial, they
were asked to choose one of three cards and were given 0,
30, or 60 yen depending upon the card chosen. Unknown to
the subjects, the amount that they could earn in each block of
eight trials was predetermined; thus, the monetary reward
each subject received during each block was systematically
manipulated (Figure 1B). After the subjects completed the mon-
Figure 1. Experimental Paradigm for the
Monetary Reward Experiment
(A) The sequences of events during a single re-
ward trial (top) and during a no-reward trial (bot-
tom). In each reward trial, subjects were asked to
choose one card within 2 s, and the outcome of
the chosen card (0, 30, or 60 yen) was shown
for 1 s. Each block consisted of eight reward or
no-reward trials (24 s). In each no-reward trial,
subjects were similarly asked to choose one
card, but the outcome was always ‘‘XXX,’’
indicating no reward.
(B) Study design of the monetary reward experi-
ment. The amount of money each subject could
earn in each block was predetermined in order
to manipulate the monetary reward level.
etary reward experiment, they were
asked to respond to several personality
questionnaires and to introduce them-
selves in front of a video camera. They
were told that others would evaluate
them based on their responses to these
questionnaires and the video-taped
self-introduction and that they would be
shown the results in the next fMRI experiment. In the social
reward experiment, the same 19 subjects were presented with
a picture of themselves and a word or phrase indicating the
impression of them formed by others (Figure 2A). However, in
reality, the items that they were presented with were predeter-
mined, such that all subjects had the same social reward expe-
rience. By systematically grouping six items (into one block)
based on desirability ratings provided by another group of par-
ticipants (n = 33), the level of social reward experienced by
subjects in each block was also manipulated. The impressions
of other people were also presented (Figure 2B), to exclude
the possibility that seeing a positive word per se might be re-
warding, as was suggested by a previous study (Hamann and
Mao, 2002).
RESULTS
Behavioral Results in the Monetary Reward Experiment
Performance
There were few trials in which the subjects did not press a button
to choose a card (an average of 0.7% per subject), and there
were no significant differences in the number of failed trials
among the three conditions.
Reaction Time
The result of a 13 3 (high monetary reward [HMR], low monetary
reward [LMR], or no monetary reward [NoMR]) repeated-mea-
sures analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a significant differ-
ence in reaction time among the conditions. Multiple compari-
sons with a Bonferroni correction showed that the mean
reaction time for the HMR condition (490 ms) was slower than
that for the NoMR condition (448 ms; p < 0.05), whereas the
mean reaction time for the LMR condition (451 ms) did not differ
significantly from the other two conditions.Neuron 58, 284–294, April 24, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 285
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Social Reward Processing in the StriatumFigure 2. Experimental Paradigm for the
Social Reward Experiment
(A) The sequence of events during an HSR-Self
trial. In a single HSR-Self trial (4 s), a picture of
each subject was shown continuously and an
item indicating the impressions of himself/herself
made by others was shown below the picture for
3 s, during which each subject was asked to rate
the desirability of the item. The item was removed
for 1 s until the next item was displayed. Six items
were presented in each block (24 s).
(B) Study design of the social reward experiment.
A 2 3 3 factorial design was used (plus fixation
rest blocks). In HSR blocks, the items presented
were all clearly positive and desirable traits,
whereas in LSR blocks the items were positive
but less desirable, and some negative items
(e.g., ‘‘selfish’’) were included. Subjects viewed
each item not only as impressions of themselves
but also as impressions of other people. Regard-
less of the impression targets, the subjects were
asked to rate the desirability of each item during
scanning. In NoSR blocks, ‘‘XXX’’ was presented
instead of an item, and the subjects were asked
to press a button each time they saw it.Behavioral Results in the Social Reward Experiment
Performance
There were few trials in which the subjects did not press a button
(an average of 1% per subject). The result of a 2 (impression tar-
get: Self or Other) 3 3 (reward level: high social reward [HSR],
low social reward [LSR], or no social reward [NoSR]) repeated-
measures ANOVA revealed no significant differences in the num-
ber of failed trials among the conditions.
Item Desirability Ratings during and after Scanning
and Subjective Happiness Ratings
An analysis of the item desirability judgment on a three-point
scale in the fMRI scanner revealed that, as predicted, regardless
of whether the items were presented as impressions of oneself or
others, those in the HSR conditions were rated as significantly
more desirable than those in the LSR conditions (HSR versus
LSR in Self and Other conditions, both p values <0.001, paired
t tests; Figure 3A). When these ratings were submitted to a 2 (im-
pression target: Self or Other)3 2 (reward level: HSR or LSR) re-
peated-measures ANOVA, the main effects of both the impres-
sion target and the reward level were significant (both p values
<0.001), and their interaction was also significant (p < 0.01).
Two paired t tests (Self versus Other in each of the HSR and
LSR conditions) showed that, although subjects were presented
with the same items between the Self and Other conditions, they
tended to rate them as significantly less desirable when they
were presented as impressions of themselves; this tendency
was somewhat stronger for the LSR condition (p < 0.01) than
the HSR condition (p < 0.05). Notably, however, the mean ratings
of the HSR items in the Self and Other conditions were close to
the maximum value (i.e., three), indicating a ceiling effect, and
when a paired-sample Wilcoxon test was used, the difference
between the HSR-Self and HSR-Other conditions was not signif-286 Neuron 58, 284–294, April 24, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc.icant (p = 0.067). The desirability ratings of the same items after
fMRI scanning with a seven-point scale also showed that sub-
jects rated items in the HSR condition as significantly more de-
sirable than those in the LSR condition (paired t test, p < 0.001;
Figure 3B).
An analysis of happiness ratings revealed that subjects felt sig-
nificantly happier when seeing impressions of themselves in the
HSR condition than in the LSR condition (paired t test, p < 0.001;
Figure 3C). Thus, as we predicted, the subjects rated items in the
HSR condition as more desirable both during and after scanning
and felt much happier in the HSR-Self condition than the LSR-
Self condition, indicating that our manipulation of the social
reward level was successful.
Reaction Time
The results of a 2 (impression target; Self or Other) 3 3 (reward
level; HSR, LSR, or NoSR) repeated-measures ANOVA of reac-
tion time revealed significant main effects of both impression tar-
get (p < 0.01) and reward level (p < 0.001) as well as their interac-
tion (p < 0.05; Figure 3D). The mean reaction time in the NoSR
condition (681 ms) was the fastest, and the subjects were slow-
est to respond in the LSR condition (1337 ms), probably because
of ambiguity regarding the desirability of the items used in this
condition. The reaction time for the HSR condition fell between
the two, with a mean of 1124 ms, and the differences among
the three conditions were all significant (multiple comparisons
with a Bonferroni correction, all p values <0.001). When condi-
tions with the same reward level were directly compared be-
tween Self versus Other using a paired t test, the mean reaction
times for the Self condition were slower than for the Other condi-
tion when the social reward level was high (p < 0.01) or low
(p < 0.05), while there was no significant difference between
the Self versus Other conditions in the NoSR condition (p = 0.48).
Neuron
Social Reward Processing in the StriatumImaging Results in the Monetary Reward Experiment
To broadly depict the brain areas related to monetary reward, we
contrasted the HMR condition with the NoMR condition. This
revealed significant activations in several brain areas, notably
the striatum, insula, midbrain, and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC)
Figure 3. Behavioral Assessment of the Validity of the Social Reward
Level Manipulation and Mean Reaction Times
(A) Item desirability ratings for HSR and LSR blocks in both the Self and Other
conditions during fMRI scanning. The subjects used a three-point scale (1 =
undesirable, 2 = neutral, and 3 = desirable).
(B) Desirability ratings for the same items after scanning. The subjects used
a seven-point scale (1 = highly undesirable, 4 = neutral, and 7 = highly desir-
able).
(C) Subjective judgment of how happy the subjects felt upon seeing each item
as an impressions of themselves formed by others, using a seven-point scale
(1 = very unhappy, 4 = neutral, and 7 = very happy).
(D) Mean reaction times for all conditions in the social reward experiment. Sub-
jects judged the desirability of each item presented in the HSR and LSR con-
ditions and pressed a button each time ‘‘XXX’’ was presented in the NoSR con-
dition.
Error bars indicate the standard error of the mean (SEM). **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05
(paired t test, two-tailed).(see Figure S1 available online), which was in agreement with
previous findings on monetary reward processing (Breiter
et al., 2001; Delgado et al., 2000, 2004; Elliott et al., 2000; Knut-
son et al., 2000, 2001; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005; Thut et al.,
1997). The areas activated in this contrast are shown in Table
S1. The subsequent analyses of the social reward experiment
used the contrast of HMR versus NoMR as a mask to explore
the overlap between monetary and social rewards.
Imaging Results in the Social Reward Experiment
To specify the brain areas involved in the processing of social re-
ward, we used the interaction contrast of (Self – Other) (HSR –
NoSR). This was intended to identify the areas where activity
was specifically enhanced when a high social reward was di-
rected toward the self. This contrast was explored within the
above-mentioned monetary reward-related areas. As predicted,
we found significant activations in the striatum (Figure 4 and
Table 1), indicating that social reward shares the same neural ba-
sis as monetary reward (all of the areas activated in this interac-
tion contrast without the mask of the monetary reward experi-
ment are listed in Table S2). Besides the striatum, only the
thalamus and cerebellum showed common activations for both
types of rewards. Within the striatum, the commonly activated
areas included the bilateral caudate nucleus and bilateral puta-
men (Figure 5A). In addition, the activated areas in the main
effects of self face (the Self – Other contrast) and other face
(the Other – Self contrast) are listed in Table S3.
The percent signal changes were extracted from the peak
voxels in these four regions of the striatum for all conditions of
the social reward and monetary reward experiments. Initially,
using only the data from the social reward experiment, four sep-
arate 2 (impression target: Self or Other)3 3 (reward level: HSR,
LSR, or NoSR) repeated-measures ANOVAs were conducted.
As predicted, we found significant interactions in all four regions
(all p values <0.05), indicating that the positivity of the items
alone (i.e., seeing positive words per se) could not explain these
results. Furthermore, within each region, the three social re-
ward levels for the Self conditions were compared with the
three Monetary Reward levels by 2 (reward types: Monetary
or Social) 3 3 (reward level: high reward, low reward, or no re-
ward) repeated-measures ANOVAs. Although the interactions
were significant in the caudate nucleus and putamen in the right
hemisphere (both p values <0.05), the corresponding regions in
the left hemisphere both showed nonsignificant interactions
(both p values >0.41) and highly significant main effects of
reward level (both p values <0.001; Figure 5B). These results
suggested that social reward was processed in a similar manner
to monetary reward, especially in the left caudate nucleus and
putamen.
DISCUSSION
The goals of the present study were to determine neurophysio-
logically whether a good reputation has a reward value and, if
so, to verify whether this important social reward is processed
in a neurally similar manner to monetary rewards. Our experi-
mental paradigm was carefully designed so that subjects be-
lieved that they were being informed of their own reputation asNeuron 58, 284–294, April 24, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 287
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Social Reward Processing in the Striatumformed by other people, while in reality the level of the social re-
ward was systematically manipulated. Our reaction-time data
in the social reward experiment first confirmed the significance
of personal reputation, as suggested by theoretical research
(Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003). Although the impression target
(Self or Other) was irrelevant to the tasks performed during scan-
ning (i.e., a desirability judgment task in the HSR and LSR condi-
Figure 4. Axial Slices Showing Areas Com-
monly Activated by Monetary and Social
Rewards
In the slices (2 mm thick, z = 16 to 22), areas ac-
tivated by monetary rewards are shown in green,
and areas activated by social reward are shown
in magenta. The contrast of HMR versus NoMR
was used for the monetary reward activation
map. The interaction contrast of (Self – Other)
(HSR – NoSR) masked by (HMR – NoMR) was
used for the social reward activation map. For both
contrasts, the statistical threshold was p < 0.005
uncorrected for multiple comparisons for height,
and cluster p < 0.05 corrected for multiple com-
parisons.
Table 1. Areas Commonly Activated by Both Types of Reward
Side
MNI Coordinate
Z Voxel Cluster pLocation x y z
(Self – Other) (HSR – NoSR)
Striatum/thalamus 866 <0.001
Putamen R 22 16 4 4.08
Caudate nucleus R 12 12 4 2.95
Thalamus L 18 6 12 3.61
Thalamus R 4 14 0 3.89
Striatum 361 0.031
Putamen L 22 20 2 3.60
Caudate nucleus L 8 14 2 3.52
Cerebellum R 10 52 34 3.29 451 0.012
Cerebellum L 4 64 12 3.90
The interaction contrast of (Self  Other) (HSR  NoSR) was explored
within the monetary reward-related areas (HMR  NoMR). The statistical
threshold for both contrasts was p < 0.005 uncorrected for height and
cluster p < 0.05 corrected for multiple comparisons.
tions and a simple button press task in
the NoSR condition), the subjects’ reac-
tion times were significantly influenced
by it. The task difficulty could not explain
the differences in reaction time (as the
tasks the subjects performed and the
items used in the Self and Other condi-
tions were identical); this suggested that
the subjects differentiated their own and
others’ reputations and could be inter-
preted as showing that one’s own reputa-
tion as formed by others automatically
captured a subject’s attention and in-
duced emotional reactions, which in turn
disrupted his or her performance (delayed reaction time) on the
item desirability judgment task.
We demonstrated that previously reported reward-related
areas, such as the striatum, insula, midbrain, and OFC, were ac-
tivated in the monetary reward experiment. Our fMRI data in the
social reward experiment showed that, as predicted, the acqui-
sition of a good reputation activated the striatum and that the
activated areas overlapped with those activated by monetary re-
wards (HMR versus NoMR). Furthermore, despite differences in
the experimental paradigm between monetary and social exper-
iments (e.g., the fact that contingency was present between the
button press response and the outcome in the monetary reward
experiment but not the social reward experiment), an analysis of
the percent signal changes in each region of the striatum indi-
cated that both types of reward were characterized by similar
activation patterns, especially in the left striatum, indicating
that the reward value of both money and a good reputation is
represented in this region.
The activations of the striatum in response to one’s own repu-
tation in the present study was interesting because the social ap-
proval gained during the experiment was from unfamiliar individ-
uals whom the subjects had never met before (this was explicitly
verified before the social reward experiment for all subjects).
Thus, there had been no prior opportunity to create an associa-
tion between social approval specifically from these people and
other rewards. Although this suggests the possibility that a good
reputation might be a primary reward, we believe that this is un-
likely, as understanding one’s own reputation requires higher288 Neuron 58, 284–294, April 24, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc.
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Social Reward Processing in the Striatumcognitive functions, such as a theory of mind (see below). In-
stead, our findings illustrate how consistently social approval
from other people is associated with other rewards during
healthy development and that, through such associations,
a good reputation might function as a conditioned stimulus
(i.e., a secondary reinforcer) for typically developing healthy
individuals.
By directly contrasting the brain activities of the same subjects
in relation to the delivery of social and monetary rewards, our re-
sults clearly show that social approval shares the same neural
basis as monetary rewards, thus providing strong support for
the idea of a ‘‘common neural currency’’ of reward (Montague
and Berns, 2002). Furthermore, our findings indicated that
a good reputation is another example of a higher cognitive re-
ward. Because the question was initially raised of whether higher
cognitive rewards, such as beauty, social joy, and love, share the
same neural mechanisms and structures as more basic rewards
(Berridge, 2003; Schultz, 2000), several neuroimaging studies
have reported activation in reward-related brain areas in re-
sponse to rewards, such as humor (Mobbs et al., 2003), attrac-
tive faces (Aharon et al., 2001), maternal and romantic love (Bar-
tels and Zeki, 2004), emotionally positive words (Hamann and
Mao, 2002), beautiful paintings (Kawabata and Zeki, 2004), and
pleasant music (Blood and Zatorre, 2001; Blood et al., 1999).
However, among such cognitive rewards, a good reputation is
of special importance because it is highly relevant to everyday
social decision making.
The present findings indicate that the social reward of a good
reputation should be incorporated into the neural model of hu-
man decision making in a similar manner to monetary rewards.
Previous neuroimaging studies on human decision making in
social situations used economic games as an experimental par-
adigm, in which subjects exchanged money with each other (de
Quervain et al., 2004; King-Casas et al., 2005; McCabe et al.,
Figure 5. Activation Patterns in Areas Com-
monly Activated by Social and Monetary
Rewards in the Striatum
(A) Coronal slices (4 mm thick, y = 12–20) showing
significant activations in the striatum for both
types of reward. The caudate nucleus and puta-
men were activated bilaterally. The scale shows
the t values.
(B) Bar graphs indicating the task-related activa-
tion (percent signal change) in the left caudate nu-
cleus [8 14 2] and left putamen [22 202] for all
three conditions during the monetary reward
experiment and all six conditions during the social
reward experiments. Error bars indicate the SEM.
2001; Rilling et al., 2002; Sanfey et al.,
2003). However, as suggested by social
exchange theory, in real social interac-
tions individuals exchange not only mate-
rial goods, such as money, but also non-
material goods (e.g., exchanging help for
approval or a good reputation). More-
over, even during monetary exchange in
an economics-based game, how one
player is viewed by others (i.e., reputation) is an important factor
influencing cooperation rates (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003).
Thus, in accordance with the argument of Montague and Berns,
our findings suggest that the striatum plays a pivotal role in con-
verting different types of rewarding stimuli, specifically money
and good reputation, into a ‘‘common currency’’ (Montague
and Berns, 2002) that is used to value each possible action on
a common scale and to select the best option in a given social
situation. This could explain why people sometimes engage in
prosocial behaviors while giving up monetary benefits (Bateson
et al., 2006; Haley and Fessler, 2005; Kurzban et al., 2007).
Although the present study focused on the similarities be-
tween monetary and social rewards, differences in brain activa-
tions between the two should be noted. Although variations in
the paradigms of our two experiments (e.g., a difference in action
contingency) made it difficult to authenticate differences in the
neural representation of the two types of reward, the medial
prefrontal cortex (mPFC) is one brain area that might be uniquely
activated by social rewards. The mPFC has been implicated in
higher cognitive functions, such as theory of mind (Gallagher
and Frith, 2003), self-reflection (Johnson et al., 2002; Kelley
et al., 2002), and reflected self-knowledge (Ochsner et al.,
2005), and could be essential for processing one’s own reputa-
tion (either good or bad), because this involves forming a repre-
sentation of how other persons represent us (Amodio and Frith,
2006). In accordance with this idea, our data showed mPFC
involvement in the representation of self-reputation regardless
of the reward level (Figure 6), a pattern which greatly differed
from that related to monetary rewards. This result was consistent
with a previous study that showed that the mPFC was activated
when trait adjectives were judged to be self-descriptive regard-
less of trait valence (Moran et al., 2006). However, an important
difference was that, while their focus was on the self-attribution
of personality traits, our study showed mPFC involvement inNeuron 58, 284–294, April 24, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 289
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Social Reward Processing in the Striatumself-reflection in the context of attributions made by others.
Thus, the present study provides preliminary evidence suggest-
ing that the neural basis of social reward processing involves the
valuation process in striatal regions and the representation of
one’s own reputation in the mPFC.
While the present study has clearly contributed to the neural
basis of social reward processing, several issues will need to
be resolved in order to create a comprehensive neural model
of social decision making. First, following on from the present
findings, the next question that should be addressed is whether
the striatum activity really predicts prosocial behaviors. This is an
important issue for testing an integrated model of human social
behavior (from brain activity to actual behaviors). Although pre-
dicting human social behaviors from patterns of brain activity
might seem unrealistic, it was previously demonstrated in the
context of economic behaviors that activities in the ventral stria-
tum, especially the nucleus accumbens (which represented
product preference), insula, and mesial prefrontal cortex (which
represented price differentials) predicted subsequent economic
decision making (i.e., whether to purchase a certain product)
(Knutson et al., 2007). Second, although we focused on the pos-
itive reward value of a good reputation, how and where the neg-
ative reward value of a bad reputation is represented remains to
be explored. One candidate area is the insula. Insula has been
suggested to play a role in loss prediction (Paulus and Stein,
Figure 6. Activation Patterns in mPFC [6 50 14]
Group activation map for the ([HSR-Self + LSR-Self]  2 NoSR-Self) contrast
(p < 0.005 uncorrected for height, and cluster p < 0.05 corrected for multiple
comparisons). mPFC activity was significantly enhanced when a subject’s
own reputation was presented (regardless of the reward level) (top). Percent
signal changes extracted from the mPFC during the social reward and mone-
tary reward experiments (bottom). Error bars indicate the SEM.290 Neuron 58, 284–294, April 24, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc.2006), and this view has been supported by studies involving
monetary rewards (Knutson et al., 2007; Kuhnen and Knutson,
2005). Another candidate area is the lateral OFC, which is acti-
vated by a range of punishment stimuli (Kringelbach and Rolls,
2004). Third, although the neurotransmitter dopamine is well
known to play a pivotal role in reward processing in animals
(Bayer and Glimcher, 2005; Schultz, 2002; Wise, 2004), it is yet
to be shown which neurotransmitter functions in social reward
processing in humans. PET studies revealed that levels of en-
dogenous dopamine in the human striatum were implicated in
food motivation (Volkow et al., 2002), playing a video game for
monetary reward (Koepp et al., 1998), and playing a card selec-
tion task for monetary reward (Zald et al., 2004). Its involvement
in processing monetary reward in humans was also demon-
strated in a study combining pharmacological and imaging tech-
niques (Pessiglione et al., 2006). Taken together, these findings
suggest that the neurotransmitter dopamine might also play
a role in processing social reward.
Furthermore, because the influence of social reward can be
seen in our everyday social interactions, the present study high-
lights several interesting areas for future research in various dis-
ciplines. First, social reward is also of interest in terms of its role
in learning, and the present findings have implications for our un-
derstanding of the neural basis of children’s moral development.
Along with ‘‘wanting’’ and ‘‘liking,’’ ‘‘learning’’ is a basic compo-
nent of reward (Berridge and Robinson, 2003). Moreover, social
rewards such as praise from parents, friends, and teachers,
seem to be the most important reinforcers during a child’s up-
bringing and learning of moral values (Bandura, 1977). Thus,
building on previous knowledge of reinforcement learning and
monetary rewards, future studies might identify the most
efficient method of educating children through social rewards.
Second, it would also be interesting to address individual and
cultural differences in brain activity in response to social re-
wards, such as how people with different self-enhancement ten-
dencies (Kwan et al., 2004) differ in their brain responses to eval-
uations made by others. These approaches should improve our
understanding of human personality and cultural differences in
various psychological tendencies (Markus and Kitayama, 1991).
As a final point, a methodological limitation of the present
study should be noted. Because our study was an initial attempt
to test whether good reputation activates the reward-related
brain areas beyond the possible reward value of positive words
per se (Hamann and Mao, 2002), we employed a block design,
which was the most efficient way in which to detect activation
(Friston et al., 1999b). For the monetary reward, evidence has ac-
cumulated indicating that activity in the striatum varies as a linear
function of expected reward (e.g., Preuschoff et al., 2006). Al-
though our results showed not only that the striatum was acti-
vated by both monetary and social rewards but also that the
striatum was sensitive to the magnitude of both types of reward,
it will be necessary to establish the reward magnitude sensitivity
in detail on a trial-by-trial basis using an event-related design, in
order to further support the common currency view of neural
valuation.
In conclusion, the current study examined the neural basis of
processing the reward value of a good reputation. To fully under-
stand how the human brain works in social interactions or the
Neuron
Social Reward Processing in the Striatumsocial brain (Brothers, 1990), it is not sufficient to investigate
brain activity in subjects while they perceive social stimuli (e.g.,
the face, gaze, and thoughts of others); yet, the majority of
human imaging studies on social cognition have adopted this
approach (for a review, see Adolphs, 2003). In real social interac-
tions, each participant is both a perceive (i.e., a target of the
perception of others) and a perceiver, and how individuals are
viewed by others has considerable influence on their behaviors.
Our findings indicate that the social reward of a good reputation
in the eyes of others is processed in an anatomically and func-
tionally similar manner to monetary rewards, and these results
represent an essential step toward a complete neural under-
standing of human social behaviors.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Subjects
In total, 23 healthy right-handed subjects participated in the study. The re-
ported analyses were based on 19 subjects (9 male; mean age = 21.6 ± 1.5
years). After the 23 subjects participated in the monetary reward experiment,
they were asked to take part in the social reward experiment. After the general
procedure of the second experiment was explained, 21 of the subjects agreed
to participate and returned to complete the social reward experiment after an
average of 15 days (range = 5–45 days). Two subjects were further excluded
from the analyses because they indicated during the interview after the social
reward experiment that they did not believe their impressions had been eval-
uated by the other people (they both reported that the impressions presented
during the scanning were ‘‘too good’’). None of the subjects had a history of
neurological or psychiatric illness. All subjects gave written informed consent
for participation, and the study was approved by the Ethical Committee of the
National Institute for Physiological Sciences, Japan.
Experimental Paradigm in the Monetary Reward Experiment
In the monetary reward experiment, the subjects performed a simple gambling
task, as described in Figure 1A, which was a block-design version of the task
used in a previous study (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005). They were encouraged to
try to earn as much money as possible and were told that one session would be
randomly chosen at the end of the experiment and that their earnings in that
session would be given to them. In each trial (3 s), the subjects were presented
with three cards labeled as ‘‘A,’’ ‘‘B,’’ or ‘‘C’’ and were asked to choose one
card within 2 s by pressing a button with the right index, middle, or ring finger,
which spatially corresponded to the location of the cards. Soon after the but-
ton press, the chosen card was highlighted with a thick white border, and the
outcome was displayed for 1 s. If the subject did not press any button within
the choice period (2 s), the card they had chosen in one previous trial was
automatically chosen, and its outcome was displayed.
When the letters on each card were written in red, the trial was a ‘‘reward
trial’’ in which each card was randomly associated with 0, 30, or 60 yen.
Each block consisted of eight trials (24 s). However, unknown to the subjects,
the total reward that they could earn in each block was predetermined
(Figure 1B). In the HMR blocks, the subjects earned an average of 330 yen
each (range = 270–390 yen), which was consistently higher than the expected
value of the eight reward trials (240 yen). In the LMR blocks, the subjects
earned an average of 150 yen each (range = 90–210 yen), which was consis-
tently lower than the expected value (note that 1 US dollar is equal to approx-
imately 120 Japanese yen). The subjects also participated in NoMR trials, in-
dicated by blue letters, in which they chose one card, but the outcome
presented was always ‘‘XXX,’’ indicating that there was no reward. A NoMR
block or a fixation rest block (also 24 s) was always inserted between two re-
ward blocks, so that the start and end of the reward manipulations could be
clearly defined. For half of the subjects, the colors (red and blue) used for
the reward and nonreward trials were switched. All subjects completed a
2 min practice task before scanning. During scanning, they performed a total
of four 8 min sessions (20 blocks for each of the four conditions [HMR, LMR,
NoMR, and fixation rest]) within which the HMR and LMR blocks were ordereddifferently, and the order of these four sessions was counterbalanced across
subjects. All subjects were paid a fixed amount for their participation at the
end of the experiment.
Experimental Paradigm in the Social Reward Experiment
The social reward experiment was divided into two parts performed on two
separate days: a self-introduction phase and a social reward acquisition
phase.
In the self-introduction phase, after the subjects finished the monetary re-
ward experiment, they were asked to complete a survey questionnaire booklet
that included several personality questionnaires and some open-ended ques-
tions. The questionnaires included the Social Desirability Scale (Crowne and
Marlowe, 1960), the Impression Management scale, a subscale of the Bal-
anced Inventory of Desirable Responding measure (Paulhus, 1984), the
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosengerg, 1965), and the NEO Five Factor In-
ventory (NEO-FFI) (Costa and McCrae, 1989). The open-ended questions were
as follows: ‘‘What do you do in your free time’’? ‘‘Briefly describe your own per-
sonality.’’ ‘‘What is your goal for the future’’? And ‘‘Please pick one problem
that modern Japanese society faces and briefly state your opinion of that is-
sue.’’ After the subjects had completed the booklets, they were asked to intro-
duce themselves for at least 1 min while being video-recorded. During this self-
introductory talk in front of a video camera, the subjects were instructed to say
anything that they liked about themselves. Digital photographs were also taken
of the subjects and were used in the subsequent social reward experiment.
The subjects were told that eight people (four male and four female) would
form impressions of them based on their answers to the personality question-
naires and the video-taped self-introduction, by selecting personality trait ad-
jectives. The subjects were asked to return to participate in the social reward
experiment some days later (individually scheduled).
In the social reward acquisition phase, the subjects were presented with the
results of the impression evaluations made during scanning (Figure 2). In real-
ity, the items that they were presented with were predetermined, and the level
of social reward experienced in each block was systematically manipulated.
For the items used in the HSR and LSR conditions, we initially picked 96 items
from an adjective list (Anderson, 1968), and a sample of 33 subjects (ten fe-
male; mean age = 23.5 ± 3.7 years) rated the desirability of these items (after
being translated into Japanese) using a nine-point scale (1 = highly undesir-
able, 5 = neutral, and 9 = highly desirable). After excluding some items, 84
were selected for the fMRI experiment (42 items each for the HSR and LSR
conditions). The mean desirability rating of the items selected for the HSR con-
dition was 7.52 and that for the LSR condition was 5.55; this difference was
highly significant (paired t test, p < 0.001). The items in the LSR condition
were rated higher than 5 (the midpoint), indicating that most of items were pos-
itive, but were less desirable than the items in the HSR condition. Furthermore,
eight negative items (with a mean desirability rating of less than 4) were also
included only in the LSR condition, in order to maintain the impression that
the subjects were being evaluated by others and also to maintain the attention
of the subjects by making their evaluations less predictable. None of the LSR
blocks contained more than one negative item. See Table S4 for examples of
the items used in each condition.
To make the results of the impression evaluation appear more believable and
meaningful, all subjects were shown pictures of eight unfamiliar individuals
and were told that they would be evaluated by these people and would meet
and engage in tasks with them after scanning. Furthermore, each subject
was told that he or she would not be evaluated by these people individually,
but rather by two groups of four evaluators. Thirty of the 42 items for both the
HSR and LSR conditions were presented twice, as they were said to have
been commonly and independently selected by both groups of evaluators.
Thus, the impressions the subjects were presented with were consistent
both among individual evaluators and among the two groups of four evaluators.
To rule out the possibility that seeing positive words per se might be reward-
ing, we included conditions in which the subjects viewed the same items but
were told that the items represented the impressions of people other than
themselves. Images of six unfamiliar people (three male and three female)
were used in these conditions, and the subjects were told that the eight asses-
sors were also evaluating these individuals. Each image of the six individuals
was equally associated with the HSR and LSR conditions. Regardless of theNeuron 58, 284–294, April 24, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 291
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item presented during scanning using a three-point scale with the index, mid-
dle, or ring finger of the right hand and to press a button with the right index
finger each time ‘‘XXX’’ was presented in an NoSR trial (the responses for
one subject were not collected due to a technical fault). A fixation rest block
was also included, during which only a fixation cross was presented at the cen-
ter of the screen for 24 s. The HSR-Self and LSR-Self blocks (and the HSR-
Other and LSR-Other block) were never presented in succession, so the start
and end of the reward level manipulations for each impression target were
clearly defined. All subjects completed a 2 min practice task before scanning,
in which no picture was included, and the subjects were asked to evaluate the
desirability of each item presented (these items were not used in the main par-
adigm). During scanning, the subjects performed a total of four sessions (each
lasting 8 min 24 s, with 12 blocks for each of 7 conditions including fixation rest
blocks). Within each session, the blocks were ordered differently, and the or-
der of the four sessions was counterbalanced across subjects. Also, while
keeping the order of item presentation constant within each session, the im-
ages of the subjects themselves and those of six other people were switched
for half of the subjects.
After scanning, the subjects completed a postexperimental questionnaire in
which they were asked to rate the subjective happiness they felt when each of
84 items was presented as an impression of themselves using a seven-point
scale (1 = very unhappy, 4 = neutral, and 7 = very happy). The subjects also
rated the desirability of each item again, but this time using a seven-point scale
(1 = highly undesirable, 4 = neutral, and 7 = highly desirable). Finally, the sub-
jects were interviewed to ascertain whether they had any doubt about the im-
pressions they saw during scanning. At the end of the social reward experiment,
all subjects were fully debriefed and paid a fixed amount for their participation.
All of the stimuli for the monetary and social reward experiments were pre-
pared and presented using Presentation software (Neurobehavioral Systems,
CA) on a microcomputer (Dimension 8200, Dell Computer Co., TX). The visual
stimuli were projected onto a half-transparent viewing screen using a liquid
crystal display (LCD) projector (DLA-M200L, Victor, Yokohama, Japan). The
screen was located behind the head coil, and the subjects viewed the stimuli
through a mirror. All of the stimuli for the tasks were written in Japanese and
presented as white letters against a black background.
Imaging Acquisition and Analysis
Images were acquired using a 3 Tesla MR imager (Allegra, Siemens, Erlangen,
Germany). For functional imaging during the sessions in both experiments, in-
terleaved T2*-weighted gradient-echo echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequences
were used to produce 44 continuous 3 mm thick transaxial slices covering
the entire cerebrum and cerebellum (repetition time [TR] = 3000 ms; echo
time [TE] = 25 ms; flip angle [FA] = 85; field of view [FOV] = 192 mm; 64 3
64 matrix; voxel dimensions = 3.03 3.03 3.0 mm). A high-resolution anatom-
ical T1-weighted image was also acquired by magnetization-prepared rapid
gradient-echo (MPRAGE) imaging (TR = 2.5 s; TE = 4.38 ms; FA = 8; 256 3
256 matrix; 192 slices; voxel dimensions = 0.75 3 0.75 3 1 mm) for each
subject.
After discarding the first six volumes to allow for stabilization of the magne-
tization, the remaining 160 volumes per session in the monetary reward exper-
iment (a total of 640 volumes per subject for four sessions) and 168 volumes
per session in the social reward experiment (a total of 672 volumes per subject
for four sessions) were used for analysis. The data were analyzed using Statis-
tical Parametric Mapping 5 (SPM5, Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurol-
ogy, London, UK) software implemented in Matlab 7.1 (Mathworks, Sherborn,
MA). Head motion was corrected using the realignment program of SPM5.
Head motion was not correlated with the task. Following realignment, the vol-
umes were normalized to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space
(Evans et al., 1994) using a transformation matrix obtained from the normaliza-
tion process of the first EPI image of each individual subject to the EPI
template. The normalized fMRI data were spatially smoothed with a Gaussian
kernel of 8 mm (full-width at half-maximum) in the x, y, and z axes.
Statistical Analysis
Statistical analysis was conducted at two levels. First, the individual task-re-
lated activation was evaluated. Second, the summary data for each individual292 Neuron 58, 284–294, April 24, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc.were incorporated into a second-level analysis using a random-effect model
(Friston et al., 1999a) to make inferences at a population level.
In the individual analysis, the signal was scaled proportionally by setting the
whole-brain mean value to 100 arbitrary units. The signal time course for each
subject was modeled with a general linear model. Regressors of interest (con-
dition effects) were generated using a box-car function convolved with a hemo-
dynamic-response function. Regressors that were of no interest, such as the
session effect, and high-pass filtering (128 s) were also included. To test
hypotheses about regionally specific effects, the estimates for each model pa-
rameter were compared with the linear contrasts shown in Table S5 (monetary
reward experiment) and Table S6 (social reward experiment).
The weighted sum of the parameters estimated in the individual analysis
consisted of ‘‘contrast’’ images, which were used for the group analyses.
The contrast images obtained by individual analysis represented the normal-
ized increment of the fMRI signal for each subject. The SPM{t} and SPM{Z}
for the contrast images were created as described above. Significant signal
changes for each contrast were assessed by means of t statistics on a
voxel-by-voxel basis. The threshold for the SPM{Z} of group analyses was
set at p < 0.005 (uncorrected for multiple comparisons) for height, and cluster
p < 0.05 (corrected for multiple comparisons).
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The Supplemental Data for this article, including a figure and tables, can be
found online at http://www.neuron.org/cgi/content/full/58/2/284/DC1/.
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